The Causality between Corporate Governance Practice and Bank Performance: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia by Utama, Cynthia A. & Musa, Haidir
227
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - September -December, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2011
The Causality between Corporate Governance Practice and
Bank Performance:
Empirical Evidence from Indonesia
Cynthia A. Utama
Research Fellow, Faculty of  Economics and Business, University of  Indonesia
Haidir Musa
Head of Macroeconomic Analyst Unit, Indonesia Stock Exchange
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business
Vol. 13, No. 3 (September - December 2011): 227 - 247
Corresponding author. E-mail: cynthiautama@yahoo.com, cynthia.afriani@ui.ac.id
ISSN: 1141-1128
http://www.gamaijb.mmugm.ac.id/
Abstract: The aim of this study is to examine the existence of causality between corporate governance
practice and performance of  commercial banks in Indonesia. We also investigate the influence of  age,
capital adequacy, and type of  commercial banks on bank performance and examine the influence of  the
bank size, foreign ownership, and listing status on corporate governance practice. The result shows that
corporate governance practice, bank size and capital adequacy ratio have positive influences on bank
performance in Indonesia. However, bank performance does not influence corporate governance prac-
tice. This study also finds that regional banks have better performance than private banks. The results of
the study support the Central Bank’s efforts to enhance CG practices in the banking sector, to strenghten
banks’ capital base and its policy to encourage banks to merge to become larger.
Abstrak: Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah menguji hubungan timbal-balik antara praktik tata kelola dan
kinerja bank umum di Indonesia. Pengujian dilakukan dengan melihat pengaruh dari umur, indikator
kecukupan modal, tipe bank terhadap kinerja bank dan selanjutnya dilihat pula pengaruh dari ukuran
bank, kepemilikan asing, dan status terdaftar di bursa terhadap praktik tata kelola bank tersebut. Hasil
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa praktik tata kelola, ukuran bank, dan rasio kecukupan modal memiliki
pengaruh positif  terhadap kinerja bank di Indonesia. Tetapi, kinerja bank tidak memiliki pengaruh terhadap
praktik tata kelolanya. Studi juga menemukan bahwa bank pemerintah daerah memiliki kinerja lebih baik
dibandingkan bank swasta nasional. Hasil penelitian ini mendukung usaha Bank Indonesia dalam
meningkatkan praktik tata kelola di dalam sektor perbankan, untuk memperkuat modal dasar bank dan
kebijakan Bank Indonesia dalam mendorong bank untuk melakukan merger dan menjadi semakin besar..
Keywords: bank performance; corporate governance; ownership structure
JEL classification: G21, G30, G34
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Introduction
Good corporate governance (hence-
forth, GCG) practice within a company plays
an important role in directing and managing
the company. GCG is needed because of  the
existence of agency problems caused by the
separation of ownership of resources and
managing those resources (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Agency problems or conflicts
of interest between principals and agents are
defined as various conducts of  agents (e.g.,
managers) that are not in accordance with the
interests of  principals (e.g., shareholders).
GCG is one mechanism to minimize the con-
flict of interest between agents and princi-
pals.
Weak corporate governance (CG) prac-
tice is believed to be one of major contribu-
tors to the Asian financial crisis that finally
led to the banking crisis (Asian Development
Bank 2000). Therefore, it is intriguing to in-
vestigate the influence of corporate gover-
nance practice on bank performance. Unfor-
tunately, the extant researches mostly inves-
tigate the influence of  CG practices on firm
performance (Gompers et al. 2003; Brown
and Caylor 2006) but empirical studies that
examine the influence of corporate gover-
nance practice on bank performance as a regu-
lated industry are rare. One example of these
studies is Andres and Vallelado (2008) who
investigate the influence of board size as a
proxy for corporate governance on bank per-
formance. The result shows that board size
has a positive effect on bank performance.
This result is also supported by Adams and
Mehran (2003) who find that the banking
sector has a larger board size compared to
the manufacturing sector and finally led to
increased bank performance.
Previous studies also investigate the
possibility of endogeneity between corporate
governance and firm performance or firm
value (Black et al. 2006; Silveira et al. 2007;
Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Sung Suk 2008).
These studies show that GCG has a positive
influence on firm performance and firm per-
formance also induces the firm to adopt a
better corporate governance (Black et al.
2006; Silveira et al. 2007; Bhagat and Bolton
2008). Meanwhile, Sung Suk (2008) fails to
find the causality between corporate gover-
nance and firm performance. He finds that
firm value has a positive influence on CG
practices but not the other way around. How-
ever, these previous studies focus on the cau-
sality between CG practices and firm perfor-
mance, not bank performance. Hence, it war-
rants further investigation to examine the
causality between corporate governance and
bank performance.
The banking sector has a prominent role
in economic development so the banking sec-
tor is highly regulated by the government
(Andres and Vallelado 2008). Adams and
Mehran (2003) state that the practices of cor-
porate governance in the banking sector dif-
fer from other sectors because of their char-
acteristics as a regulated industry. In Indone-
sia, the regulator in the banking sector is the
central bank, i.e. Bank Indonesia and is sup-
ported by the government in managing eco-
nomic and financial stability of the nation.
Bank Indonesia Decree No. 8/4/PBI/2006
requires the banking sector to report their cor-
porate governance practices in the form of  a
self-assessment working paper GCG. This
form comprises a composite score that com-
bines all of the assessment on CG in a bank.
Self-assessment reporting on corporate gov-
ernance practices has the purpose of increas-
ing the transparency in the banking sector.
This self-assessment is expected to meet the
objective of the regulator to improve the per-
formance of  the banking sector through the
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improvement and implementation of  GCG.
Furthermore, some previous studies
show that bank performances are also af-
fected by age of a bank, capital adequacy ra-
tio, and type of  commercial bank. The age
of a bank positively affects the bank perfor-
mance due to age having a positive correla-
tion with experience (i.e. learning curve)
which finally leads to higher performance
(DeYoung and Hasan 1998; DeYoung et al.
1999). A capital adequacy ratio set by the
regulator is required to meet minimum capi-
tal requirements so the bank’s management
will manage their assets properly and this will
increase the bank performance (Unite and
Sullivan 2003; Naceur and Kandil 2009). The
type of commercial bank also influences bank
performance. For example, in Indonesia, re-
gional banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah)
are supported by local government funding.
Hence, high support of government funding
results in increased funds availability for lend-
ing at relatively low rates compared to those
of  private banks. Therefore, high capacity to
provide credit and the support by government
cause the bank to have a close relationship
with a particular community and improve
their performance. This condition is similarly
applicable to foreign banks and joint venture
banks (Havrylchyk 2006).
CG practices are also determined by
bank size, foreign ownership, and listing sta-
tus at the stock exchange. Bank size has a
positive impact on CG practices (Demsetz
1983; Levine 2004; Black et al. 2006). Large
banks have less asymmetric information so
they tend to implement GCG. Meanwhile, the
existence of foreign parties in the bank own-
ership structure will have a positive impact
on bank governance. The reason is that the
foreign party will provide a source of capital
and transfer knowledge to improve the bank
governance (Bonin 2005; Williams and
Nguyen 2005). Banks that are listed in capi-
tal markets tend to have better CG practices
because they are closely monitored by inves-
tors who demand that the banks increase their
transparency and disclosure through good
corporate governance practice (Akhigbe and
Martin 2008).
Based on the above explanation, the
purpose of this study is to investigate the
causality between CG practices and bank
performance (i.e. bank profitability) in Indo-
nesia. We also investigate whether: 1) the CG
practices are also determined by bank age,
capital adequacy ratio, and type of  bank
(state-owned banks, regional banks, and pri-
vate banks , foreign-owned banks; 2) bank
performance is also affected by foreign-owned
banks, listing status, and bank size. We con-
tribute to the extant research by providing
more in-depth knowledge about the causal-
ity between CG practices and performance
in the banking sector as a regulated industry.
The previous studies generally focus on the
causality between CG practices and firm per-
formance. The intriguing issue that warrants
further study is the banking sector as a regu-
lated industry having a stringent regulation
related to CG practices than other industries.
The differences of commercial banks regula-
tion according to Bank Indonesia Decree No.
8/4/PBI/2006 compared to other public
listed companies among others are: 1) the
proportion of independent commissioners to
total board of commissioners is 50 percent
while for other listed companies based on In-
donesian Stock Exchange Directors Decree
No. Kep-308/BEJ/07-2004 is 30%; 2) Capi-
tal Market Supervisory Boards Decree No.
Kep-29/PM/2004 requires public listed com-
panies to have an audit committee while Bank
Indonesia requires commercial banks to have
not only an audit committee but a risk man-
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agement committee and remuneration and
nomination committee as well. Therefore, the
uniqueness of bank characteristics may af-
fect their performance differently than other
public listed companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
and hypotheses development. Section 3 de-
scribes data and methodology. Section 4 de-
scribes the empirical results and section 5
concludes the paper.
Literature Review and
Hypotheses Development
The empirical researches find that CG
practiced have a positive impact on bank
performance (Gompers et al. 2003, Brown
and Caylor 2006; Andres and Vallelado 2008,
Bhagat and Bolton 2008). Choe and Lee
(2003) show that banking sector board gov-
ernance-related reforms are strongly and posi-
tively related to market-based measures of
corporate performance (i.e., cumulative ab-
normal return). This finding supports
Roseinstein and Wyatt (1990) who find that
better CG practices (i.e., strengthening of
executive stock compensation and other com-
pensation, effective audit committee) has a
positive relationship with stock market reac-
tion (i.e., cumulative abnormal return).
In Indonesia, Bank Indonesia regulation
No. 8/14/PBI/2006 on CG in the banking
sector aims to improve banks’ performance,
to protect the interests of stakeholders, to
improve the compliance with regulations and
business ethics applicable in the banking in-
dustry. Likewise in the manufacturing sector,
the corporate governance in the banking sec-
tor is a mechanism to manage a variety of
stakeholders’ interests so the conflict of in-
terest among them can be mitigated. Based
on the above argument, we posit the hypoth-
esis as follows.
H
1.1
: Corporate governance practice has a positive
influence on bank performance.
DeYoung and Hasan (1998) find that
bank performances are positively affected by
bank age. DeYoung et al. (1999) assert that
the bank begins its operations as a financial
intermediary firm entering the market and
competition on a certain scale. A newly es-
tablished bank has certain characteristics and
its own-way of managing the operation com-
pared to an older bank. As it is reaching its
maturity stage, a bank has more experience
in managing and deciding appropriate poli-
cies to cope with the rapid changes in the in-
dustry. Therefore, based on this argument,
the hypothesis can be posed as follows:
H
1.2
: Bank performance is positively affected by its
age.
The compliance with a capital adequacy
ratio (henceforth, CAR) requirement in com-
mercial banks aims to improve the operational
functions, security functions and bank regu-
lation (Siamat 2004). An adequate CAR ac-
companied by effective and efficient bank
management and lending activities are ex-
pected to improve the performance of  a bank.
Naceur and Kandil (2009) find that the role
of regulators in setting the minimum level of
CAR will increase the bank performance.
This empirical finding is also corroborated by
Supriyatna et al. (2007) who argue that CAR
may reduce the deterioration of bank perfor-
mance and can be used to classify the bank
performance as good or bad. CAR also re-
flects the compliance level of a bank with
the regulation and represents their protection
of public interest. Hence, we state the fol-
lowing hypothesis as follows.
H
1.3:
 The capital adequacy ratio has a positive in-
fluence on bank performance.
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The existence of different types of com-
mercial banks affects the level of bank per-
formance. Commercial banks have a variety
of financial support, reputation, and lending
activities (Siamat 2004). The type of banks
that have higher funding support, reputation,
and lending activities should result in a bet-
ter bank performance. Havrylchyk (2006)
states that the existence of different types of
banks affect the individual bank perfor-
mances. In Indonesia, the types of  banks are
state-owned banks, private banks (i.e.,
Syari’ah banks, foreign exchange banks and
non-foreign exchange banks), regional banks,
and joint venture banks (mixed).
The aforementioned studies show that
state-owned banks perform more efficiently
than foreign banks (Chang et al. 1998; De
Young and Nolle 1996; and Micco et al.
2007). This finding is also supported by
Bhattacharrya et al. (1997) who state that
state-owned Indian commercial banks per-
form more efficiently than foreign and pri-
vate banks. The argumentations are: 1) For-
eign banks have a lack of understanding
about the domestic market and local clients
of the host country therefore this condition
inhibits the foreign banks from achieving
higher performance (De Young and Nolle
1996); 2) Because state-owned banks have
the government as the majority shareholder,
they have a higher credibility in providing bank
stability and the safety of deposits and con-
sequently attract a large amounts of deposits
at a relatively low cost (Altunbas et al. 2001).
Hence, we conclude that state-owned banks
have a high financial support from the gov-
ernment as well as its lower risk image by the
public compared to private banks. These cir-
cumstances yield a higher effectiveness in
managing operational of state-owned banks
compared to private banks. Thus, the state-
owned banks have a higher bank performance
than that of  other banks. Likewise, the argu-
mentation is also applied to regional banks
that obtain financial support from the local
government and are perceived to have lower
risk than private banks. We assert the follow-
ing hypothesis.
H
1.4
.: State-owned banks have a higher bank per-
formance than that of private banks.
H
1.5
.: Regional banks have a higher bank perfor-
mance than private banks.
Empirical studies find that foreign own-
ership increases bank return (Goldberg et al.
2000; Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001;
Yudaeva et al. 2003; Choi and Hasan 2005;
Havrylchyk 2006 in Kim and Rasiah 2010).
They argue that foreign-owned banks are
more efficient (Havrylchyk 2003) and more
productive (Yudaeva et. al. 2003) than do-
mestic-owned banks. But, Choi and Hasan
(2005) emphasize that the positive impact of
foreign ownership on a bank’s returns de-
pends on their ownership level. Further,
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) show that
bank returns and risk are positively affected
by the existence of foreign director on board,
not determined by the number of  outside
board of  directors. The foreign-owned banks
are usually supported by their holding com-
pany abroad. Hence, their management and
lending activities are more effective and effi-
cient than domestic-owned banks. Therefore,
foreign-owned banks have a better perfor-
mance than other banks.
In Indonesia, banks with foreign own-
ership are divided into three groups, namely
those that operate: 1) as a branch office (re-
ferred to as foreign banks; 2) as a subsidiary,
either through joint ventures with domestic
or local bank (called as mixed banks), or
through mergers and acquisitions with do-
mestic banks (divestment program), and; 3)
as a representative office. The main differ-
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ence between foreign banks and joint ven-
ture banks are their legal form. Foreign banks
still have a legal form in accordance with their
headquarters abroad and constitute as a sig-
nificant part of  the headquarters. As a con-
sequence, the financial policy of foreign banks
mostly depend on their headquarters, and the
loans are generally provided to large firms.
Whereas, joint venture banks (mixed banks)
have a domestic legal form and legally con-
stitute a separate entity from their headquar-
ters, their legal form is one of  limited corpo-
ration (Hadad et al. 2011). Further, the com-
pliance of joint venture banks (mixed banks)
to government regulation are expected to be
higher than domestic banks because joint
venture banks are constituently bound to
government regulation. In other words, the
foreign investment in Indonesia through joint
venture banks (mixed banks) is closely su-
pervised and this close supervision increases
their performance. So, we state the following
hypothesis.
H
1.6
: Foreign-owned banks have a higher bank per-
formance than other banks.
Previous researches investigate the
endogeneity between CG and a firm’s value
in manufacturing industry (Bhagat and Black
2002; Black et al. 2006). Using ordinary least
square (OLS) regression, Bhagat and Black
(2003) report that board independence in-
creases a firm’s performance but on the other
hand, a deterioration in that performance
causes the firm to increase the independence
of  their boards of  directors. But, after con-
trolling this endoneity effect, this simulta-
neous equation is weakened and is not sig-
nificant. Further, Black et al. (2006) find the
endogeneity effect between CG and a firm’s
value. They show that an increase of 10
points in the corporate governance index pre-
dicts a 18 percent increase in Tobin’s q and a
43 percent increase in market/book ratio, and
vice versa. They give two explanations regard-
ing this causality relationship: 1) signalling,
i.e. firms employ a GCG to signal their qual-
ity; 2) reverse causality, i.e., higher firm value
causes firms to adopt better governance rules.
Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), Bolton and
Bhagat (2008), Cornett et al. (2009) show the
endogeneity relationship between CG and
bank performance. Cornet et al. (2009) find
that stronger board in the banking industry
can be achieved by higher bank performance
and CEO pay-based on firm performance as
well, vice versa. The above argument leads
us to the following hypothesis:
H
2.1
: Bank performance has a positive influence on
CG.
 Previous researches show that foreign-
owned banks are positively related to CG
practices (De Angelo and De Angelo 1985;
Zingales 1994; and Douma, George, and
Kabir 2003). They argue that banks with high
foreign ownership employ better corporate
governance practices because of their larger
ownership, higher investment and long-term
commitment.
A government regulation, No. 29 of
1999 related to share purchase of commer-
cial banks, entitles foreigners to own com-
mercial banks’ with a share of up to 99 per-
cent. The presence of a foreign party is ex-
pected to provide a source of capital and
knowledge transfer and ultimately the bank’s
practices and management will be improved
(Bonin 2005; Williams and Nguyen 2005).
Therefore, foreign ownership provides an
improvement in corporate governance prac-
tices in the banking sector. Based on these
arguments, then the hypothesis can be for-
mulated as follows:
H
2.2
: Foreign-owned banks have a better GCG prac-
tices than other banks.
233
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - September -December, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2011
Listed banks at the Indonesia Stock
Exchange have to comply with CG regula-
tions set by the Capital Market Supervisory
Body (i.e., Bapepam-LK) and the central bank
(i.e., Bank Indonesia). Hence, listed banks
face a higher requirement in terms of  GCG
practices compared to non-listed banks.
Akhigbe and Martin (2008) state that inves-
tors in capital markets give a higher value to
banks with GCG practices because they have
better transparency and disclosure.
Hadad et al. (2003) documented that
listed commercial banks comprised only 17
percent of all banks (24 out of 141) as of
December 2002. Further, listed banks tend
to have a higher performance, even though
the correlation between listing status and bank
performance is weak. This led us to hypoth-
esize as follow.
H
2.3
: Listed banks have better CG practices than
non-listed banks.
A previous strand of literature employs
size of bank as a control variable (Demsetz
1983; Levine 2004; Kanchel 2007). They ar-
gue that the extent of  asymmetric informa-
tion between insider and outside investors
will be higher for a larger bank. A bank with
larger size is characterized by higher complex-
ity and information discrepancies. Therefore,
GCG is required to increase bank’s transpar-
ency and disclosure. Thus, we hypothesize
as follow.
H
2.4
: Bank size has a positive impact on CG.
Methodology
Sample
We obtain a sample of  all commercial
banks operating in 2008 from Bank Indone-
sia.1 Based on Table 1 provided below, listed
commercial banks at Bank Indonesia in 2008
amounted to 123. However, 25 of these com-
mercial banks did not report their CG self-
assessment rating. Therefore, the sample of
commercial banks that can be used is 98.
Further, we checked for outliers and yielded
90 observations after eliminating 9 outliers.
An outlier is often operationally defined as a
value that is at least 3 standard deviations
above or below the mean.2
Financial reporting data (e.g., ROA,
ROE), the age of a bank, capital adequacy
ratio, the types of  banks, bank size, and own-
ership structure of  commercial banks were
gathered from Bank Indonesia and Infobank
magazine. We collected the score of  CG prac-
tices of banks based on self-assessment on
GCG implementation according to Bank In-
donesia rule No. 8/14/PBI/2006 and pub-
lished by Infobank magazine. The detailed
aspects of CG practices being appraised are
provided in Appendix. The following is Bank
Indonesia rule No. 8/14/PBI/2006, Article
65 that requires banks’ self-assesment on
GCG:
1) Bank must perform a self-assesment on
Good Corporate Governance implemen-
tation which covers items stipulated in Ar-
ticle 2 Paragraph (2) at least 1 (one) time
each year.
1 The period of  study is year 2008 because Bank Indonesia regulation no. 8/14/PBI/2006 on GCG for commer-
cial bank was revised to Bank Indonesia regulation no. 8/14/PBI/2006 and circular letter no. 9/12/DPNP issued on
May 30 2007 is effective on beginning of 2008.
2 http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/regression_intro.htm
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2) The result of self assesment on Good Cor-
porate Governance implementation as
refererred to in paragraph (1) is an inte-
grated part of Good Corporate Gover-
nance implementation report.
3) The procedure for assesment as referred
to in paragraph (1) shall be regulated in a
Bank Indonesia Circular Letter.
Further, Article 75 stipulates that if a
bank submits a significantly inaccurate and
or incomplete report shall be imposed with
administrative sanction in the form of  a pay-
ment obligation of Rp250,000,000 (two
hudred fifty million rupiahs) and administra-
tive sanctions such as lowering the bank’s
health rating in the form of  decreasing the
level of  management factor in bank’s health
appraisal, freezing of certain business activi-
ties, etc. The Central Bank also reviews the
results of self-assessment and may require
modification of  the results if  necessary. Be-
cause the threat of sanctions and the exist-
ence of inspection by the Central Bank, we
believe that the self-assesment of CG prac-
tices in bank report to be relatively accurate
and reliable.
Definition of  Variables
According to Manlagnit (2011), the
bank performance can be appraised by cost
efficiency and profitability. He mentions that
the stochastic cost frontier analysis (Aigner
et al. 1977, and Meusen and van der Broeck
1977) and ratio of total costs to total assets
of banks (Cost/TA) can deployed as proxies
of cost efficient while return on assets
(ROA), return on equity, and ratio of  net in-
terest income to average interest earnings
assets (NII) can be used as proxies of profit-
ability. Further, he states that bank cost inef-
ficiency levels usually have a positive corre-
lation with the cost ratio and, by contrast,
has a negative correlation with profitability
measures. Further, Coleman et al. (2006) and
Akhigbe and McNulty (2011) employs ROA
as a control for differences in cost or profit
efficiency. He corroborates that more effi-
cient banks are to be more focussed on cost
control. Lin and Zhang (2009) also use re-
turn on assets (ROA) as measurement of  bank
performance (i.e. profitability). But accord-
ing to Rhoades (1998) in Lin and Zhang
(2009), ROA is biased upward for banks that
earn significant profits from off-balance sheet
operations such as derivative securities, as
these activities generate revenue and expenses
but not recorded as assets.
Therefore, Lin and Zhang (2009) deploy re-
turn on equity (ROE) as an alternative mea-
sure of profitability.
We use two proxies of  bank profitabil-
ity, i.e., Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on
Equity (ROE). ROA reflects the deployment
of bank assets to yield its income (Adams
Table 1. Summary of  Sample Selection Procedure
Data N
Commercial Banks listed on Central Bank at 31 December 2008 123
Commercial Bank do not fully report the self-assessment of CG practice (25)
Commercial banks with outliers (9)
Total Observations 90
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and Mehran 2003; Siamat 2004; Andres and
Vallelado 2008; Chritopher 2009). ROA
equals after tax net income (profits) divided
by average total assets of bank (Saunders and
Cornett 2005 in Christopher 2009, Lin and
Zhang 2009). But, we have to be cautious
with this measurement because bank perfor-
mance can be increased by cutting expenses,
such as advertising and R&D so the bank’s
profitability will be higher in the short-term
but with a sacrifice in their long-term profit-
ability. Further, total assets as a denominator
are very sensitive to the accounting methods
used by the banks.
This study also uses ROE as a proxy of
bank performance relevant to shareholder’s
investment (Siamat 2004; Berger, et al. 2005;
Kim and Rasiah 2010). ROE is a net income
available to common stockholders divided by
common equity (Brigham and Ehrhardst
2005). But, Christopher (2009) mentions that
banks may employ high leverage to increase
their ROE. Based on a composite index of a
bank’s CG provided by Bank Indonesia, the
rating has a range value between 1-5. Accord-
ing to Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 8/14/
PBI/2006 and Bank Indonesia Circular Let-
ter No. 9/12/DPNP issued on May 30 2007,
the categories of CG practices based on the
bank’s CG are shown in Table 2.
The lower value of the composite in-
dex indicates that the practice of corporate
governance is better. Therefore, in order to
avoid misinterpretation from the above stated
hypotheses, we modify the output of the com-
posite index as follows: Five – the composite
index. The score of 5 (five) implies a maxi-
mum value of corporate governance practice
that can be obtained.
Age of bank is measured by logarithm
of age of bank since its establishment. Capi-
tal Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is a measurement
of bank capacity in fulfilling its obligation and
also a proxy of credit risk and operational
risk. This is stated as a percentage of the risk
from bank’s capital.3 The size of  bank is calcu-
lated by logarithm of  total assets. We use cate-
gorical variables for type of banks and assign
private banks as the basis of comparison.
Empirical Models
To address the simultaneous relation-
ship between CG and bank performance, we
employ two-stage least square estimator
(2SLS) regressions. Thus, the empirical mo-
dels consist of two models: the first model is
to investigate the effect of CG practice, age
of bank, CAR, and types of bank on bank
performance, while the second model is to in-
vestigate the influence of  bank performance,
bank size, foreign ownership and listing sta-
tus on CG practice. Each model consists of
two regressions because we use two proxies
of  bank performance. The empirical models
are provided below.
Table 2. The Categories of  Bank’s CG
Practices of Based on Output of
Composite Index
Composite Index Category
Composite index < 1.5 very good
1.5  Composite index < 2.5 Good
2.5  Composite index< 3.5 fair
3.5  Composite index< 4.5 Poor
4.5  Composite Index< 5 very poor
Source: Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No. 9/12/DPNP
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_adequacy_ratio.
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or
or
where

n
, 
n
: constants and coefficients of
regressions
: error Term
ROA: Return on Assets
ROE: Return on Equity
CICG: Composite index of corporate
governance
AGE: Logarithm of age of bank
since its established
CAR: Capital adequacy ratio
SOE: Dummy variable, takes the
value of one if state-owned
bank and zero otherwise.
REGIONAL: Dummy variable, take the
value of one if regional bank
and zero otherwise.
FOB: Dummy variable, takes the
value of one if foreign-owned
bank and zero otherwise.
SIZE: Logarithm of  bank’s total as-
sets
FOREIGN: Dummy variable, takes the
value of one if there is an ex-
istence of foreign ownership
and zero otherwise.
LISTED: Dummy variable, takes the
value of one if the bank is
listed at the Indonesia Stock
Exchange and zero otherwise.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for data is pro-
vided in Table 3, shows that the average value
of  ROA is 2.5109 percent with minimum
value and maximum value consecutively are
-1.63 percent and 7.11. While, the average
value of ROE is 15.8062 percent with a mini-
mum value and maximum value consecutively
-4.02 percent and 46.85 percent. This result
shows that the average bank performance in
managing its assets and return to shareholders
is relatively good. The average of CICG is
1.8868 (5-3.1132 = 1.8868). CICG of 1.8868
indicates that the average CG practices in the
banking sector are in a good category. The
minimum value of CICG is 3.15 (5-1.85 =
3.15) or in fair category and maximum value
is 1.00 (5-4 = 1) or in very good category.
ROA
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The average of  CAR in Table 3 is 25.39
percent with a minimum value and maximum
value consecutively are 10.34 percent and
68.65 percent. Based on Bank Indonesia
Regulation No. 9/13/PBI/2007, the mini-
mum CAR is 8 percent. Therefore, the CAR
held by commercial banks in Indonesia al-
ready meets the requirements of the regula-
tor. This condition also reflects that commer-
cial banks are quite conservative in their capi-
tal structure policy.
Banks in Indonesia consist of 5.6 per-
cent state-owned banks (i.e. 5 banks out of
90 total banks), 26.7 percent regional banks
(i.e., 24 banks out of 90 total banks), and
18.90 percent joint venture banks (i.e., 17
banks out of 90 total banks). The rest of the
banks in Indonesia are private banks , that is
44 or almost 50%). In addition, the average
foreign ownership in banks’ ownership struc-
ture is 37.8 percent or 34 banks with foreign
ownership. Finally, the percentage of  com-
mercial banks that are listed at the Indonesia
Stock Exchange is 26.67 percent or 24 com-
mercial banks.
Univariate Test of  Performance
Across Types of  Banks
As shown in Table 4, the results of  a t-
test for mean difference of  bank performance
show that: 1) the averages of regional banks’
performances (i.e., ROA is 3.68% and ROE
is 27.80%) are significantly higher than those
of  the other-banks (i.e., ROA is 2.084% and
ROE is 11.444%). These results corroborate
the H
1.5
 hypothesis; 2) the average of foreign-
owned banks’ performance proxied by ROA
is significantly higher than that of the other-
banks (3.21% vs 2.35%), however it is not
significantly different from other banks if
performance is measured by ROE. Thus, the
result with regard to the H
1.6
 is mixed; 3) the
averages of  state-owned banks’ performances
(i.e., based on ROA and ROE) are not sig-
nificantly different from those of the other
banks. Therefore, the H
1.4
 is not substantiated;
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
ROA 8.74 -1.63 7.11 2.51 1.61
ROE 50.87 -4.02 46.85 15.81 11.32
CICG 2.15 1.85 4.00 3.11 0.52
AGE 3.12 1.61 4.73 3.38 0.59
CAR 58.31 10.34 68.65 25.40 14.33
SIZE 7.81 25.70 33.51 29.28 1.77
SOE 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.23
REGIONAL 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44
FOB 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39
FOREIGN 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49
LISTED 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44
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Table 4.T-test for Mean Difference of  Bank Performance Based on Ownership Struc-
ture
Category Group Statistics N Mean of*ROA Mean of*ROE
SOE 1 5 2.544 18.338
(0.481) (0.305)
0 85 2.509 15.657
(0.476) (0.318)
Regional 1 24 3.686 27.803
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
0 66 2.084 11.444
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
FOB 1 17 3.211 12.902
(0.023)** (0.122)
0 73 2.348 16.483
(0.043)** (0.040)**
Private 1 44 1.596 10.097
(0.000)*** (0.000)**
0 46 3.386 21.267
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Note: the p-values are shown in parentheses whereas the coefficient estimates are on the first row
***Significant at 0.01(1-tailed); **Significant at 0.05(1-tailed); *Significant at 0.10(1-tailed)
Table 5. T-test for Mean Difference of  Foreign Ownership and Listed Status on Practice
of  Corporate Governance
Category Group Statistics N Mean of CICG
Foreign 1 34 3.201
(0.108)
0 56 3.060
(0.114)
Listed 1 24 3.331
(0.008)***
0 66 3.034
(0.009)***
***Significant at 0.01(1-tailed); **Significant at 0.05(1-tailed); *Significant at 0.10(1-tailed)
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4) Private banks have a lower performance
(i.e., average ROA is 1.596% and ROE is
10.097%) than that of  other-banks (i.e., ROA
is 3.386% and ROE is 21.267%).
Table 5 shows that the average of  for-
eign-owned banks’ CICIG is not significantly
different from that of the other banks while
the average of listed banks’ CICG on Indo-
nesian Stock Exchange (i.e., CICG is 3.331)
is significantly higher than that of the other
banks (i.e.,CICG is 3.034).
Correlation Analysis
The bivariate analysis in Table 6 shows
the highest correlation is between and regional
banks and ROA (r = 0.444) and between re-
gional banks and ROE (r = 0.642). In addi-
tion, the bivariate analysis in Table 7 shows
the highest correlation is between size and
CICG (r = 0.424). This should not be a con-
cern until it exceeds 0.8. The table also indi-
cates that apparently there is no serious
multicollinearity among the independent vari-
ables.
As presented in Table 6, regional banks
have a significant positive correlation with
ROA and ROE (both significant at 99% con-
fidence level) while foreign-owned banks
have a significant positive correlation with
ROA (significant at 95% confidence level)
and CAR has a significant positive correla-
tion with ROE (significant at 99% confidence
level). Further, from Table 7, it can be ob-
served that the size and listing status is sig-
nificantly correlated with the CICG at 99
percent confidence level with the predicted
sign. The bivariate analysis is intriguing be-
cause the results provide a basis for interpret-
Table 6. Pearson Correlation Analysis for Model 1a
    ROA NKCG lnAGE CAR SOE RE-
GIONAL
ROA Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (1-tailed)  
ROE Pearson Correlation 0.648 **
Sig. (1-tailed) 0
CICG Pearson Correlation 0.039 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.358  
AGE Pearson Correlation 0.159 0.128 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.067 0.114  
CAR Pearson Correlation 0.096 -0.167 -0.332 ** 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.184 0.058 0.001
SOE Pearson Correlation 0.005 0.144 0.088 -0.1 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.481 0.088 0.204 0.174
REGIONAL Pearson Correlation 0.444 ** -0.062 0.431 ** -0.144 -0.146 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0 0.281 0 0.088 0.084  
FOB Pearson Correlation 0.211 * -0.005 -0.237 * 0.145 -0.117 -0.291 **
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.023 0.479 0.012 0.086 0.136 0.003
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
a The untabulated results for ROE indicate regional banks have a positve correlation with ROE (sig. at 5% level) while
none of other variables have a correlation with ROE.
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Table 7. Pearson Analysis for Model 2b
    CICG ROA ROE lnSIZE FOROWN
CICG Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (1-tailed)  
ROA Pearson Correlation 0.039 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.358  
ROE Pearson Correlation 0.125 0.648 ** 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.12 0  
SIZE Pearson Correlation 0.424 ** 0.126 0.402 ** 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0 0.118 0  
FOREIGN Pearson Correlation 0.132 -0.042 -0.252 ** 0.292 ** 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.108 0.347 0.008 0.003  
LISTED Pearson Correlation 0.253 ** -0.217 * 0.012 0.485 ** 0.204 *
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.008 0.02 0.457 0 0.027
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
b The untabulated results for ROE show that none of variables have a correlation with ROE.
ing the results of two-stage least squares (2-
SLS) in investigating of the endogeneity be-
tween CG practices and bank’s performance.
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
Regressions Results
Table 8 and 9 present regression results
of  the 2SLS regressions. Both tables show
that the CG practices in the banking sector
positively influence the level of bank perfor-
mance as measured by ROA and ROE, sup-
porting hypothesis H
1.1
. On the other hand,
the level of  bank performance does not have
a positive impact on CG practice. Therefore,
this study corroborates the previous studies
that find the positive impact of CG practices
on bank performance (Adam and Mehran
2003; Gompers et al 2003; Brown and Caylor
2006; Andres and Vallelado 2008; Bhagat and
Bolton 2008) but fails to support the
endogeneity relationship between CG and
bank performance as documented by Bhagat
and Jefferis (2002), Bolton and Bhagat
(2008), Cornett et al. (2009). Thus, hypoth-
esis 2.1 (H
2.1
) is not substantiated.
The absence of a causality relationship
between corporate governance and bank per-
formance may be due to the bank industry
being regulated. As we know, CG practices
of  banks are regulated by Bank Indonesia rule
No. 8/14/PBI/2006 so banks with good cor-
porate governance practices will achieve
higher bank profitability, not vice versa.
An age of bank does not have a posi-
tive effect on bank performance, so hypoth-
esis H
1.2
 is not supported. Thus, this study
does not corroborate the argumentation that
age of bank yields higher experiences that are
needed to increase bank performance
(Mamoghli and Dhoibi 2009).
The CAR has a positive effect on as
measured by ROA (Return on Assets), so the
hypothesis H
1.3
 is substantiated. The results
are consistent with previous research con-
ducted by Nanceur and Kandil (2009). The
existence of  the bank’s capital is an impor-
tant instrument to preserve the liquidity of
the bank (Siamat 2004). However, we fail to
find the positive effect of CAR on ROE.
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Table 8. The Causality Output Statistics of  ROA and CICG
  ROA CICG
  Hypothesis Coefficient p-value Hypothesis Coefficient p-value
ROA     + -0.017 0.385
CICG + 1.102 0.061 *  
AGE + -0.029 0.4625  
CAR + 0.022 0.029 **  
SOE + 0.767 0.134  
REGIONAL + 2.256 0.000 ***  
FOB + 1.537 0.000 ***  
SIZE   + 0.120 0.001 ***
FOREIGN   + 0.002 0.495
LISTED   + 0.050 0.373
Intercept   -2.318 0.158   -0.384 0.355
Adjusted R Square   0.305 0.144
F-Statistics   7.506 0.000 ***   4.746 0.002 ***
*significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 percent level
Table 9. The Causality Output Statistics of  ROE and CICG
  ROE CICG
  Hypothesis Coefficient p-value Hypothesis Coefficient p-value
ROE       + -0.004 0.313
CICG + 12.464 0.006 ***  
AGE + 1.802 0.199  
CAR + -0.119 0.069  
SOE + 2.934 0.270  
REGIONAL + 16.801 0.000 ***  
FOB + 3.504 0.11  
SIZE   + 0.132 0.004 ***
FOREIGN   + -0.034 0.403
LISTED   + 0.050 0.361
Intercept   -31.363 0.026 **   -0.693 0.294
Adjusted R Square   0.426 0.146
F-Statistik   12.019 0.000 ***   4.802 0.002 ***
* significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 percent level
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We find that regional banks have a bet-
ter performance (in both performance mea-
sures) than private banks. Therefore, we con-
clude that hypotheses H
1.5
 is supported. As
mentioned above, regional banks have full
funding support from local governments
where they operate. A greater financial sup-
port, as well as a good image perceived by
the public provides easier access to increase
lending activities and bank performance
(Altunba et al. 2001).
Meanwhile, being foreign-owned has a
positive influence on bank performance
proxied by ROA only. This finding supports
the argumentation that foreign-owned banks
are more efficient (Havrylchyk 2003) and
more productive (Yudaeva et al. 2003) than
domestic-owned banks when using ROA as
the profitability measurement. This finding
is also corroborated by Demirguc- Kunt and
Huzinga (2000), Bonin et al. (2005), and
Micco et al. (2007). Micco et al. (2007) that
show that the average foreign bank located
in developing country has a ROA that is 0.37
percent points higher than that of a compa-
rable private bank. Therefore, foreign banks
located in developing countries tend to be
more profitable than private banks. ROE may
have drawbacks as a performance measure-
ment so we fail to find the influence of for-
eign ownership on bank profitability. Berger
et al. (2005) provide two main reasons of less
appealing of  ROE as bank performance mea-
surement, i.e.:
1) ROE does not control for the bank’s out-
put which may be very difficult to change,
at least in the short run other than by a
large governance change. Thus, one bank
may significantly more profitable than an-
other due to scale or output mix, rather
than quality of its management.
2) ROE is not adjusted for changes over time
in the distribution of bank profitability or
variability of  bank profits.
Further, foreign banks may have a lack
of understanding about the domestic market
and local clients in the host country there-
fore this condition inhibits the foreign banks
from achieving higher performance (De
Young and Nolle 1996).
Furthermore, we find that CG practices
are positively affected by size of bank, or only
hypothesis H
2.2
 is supported. This finding sup-
ports the previous studies that find a posi-
tive relationship between bank size and cor-
porate governance practice (Black et al 2006;
Sung Suk 2008). Levine (2004) argues that a
larger size needs a higher GCG to reduce
asymmetric information between insider and
outsider investors.
The implications of the findings are as
follows. Since we find that CG practices en-
hance performance, then this finding supports
the Central Bank’s efforts to enhance CG
practices in the banking sector. We document
the positive impact of bank size on perfor-
mance. Thus, this finding supports the cen-
tral bank’s policy to encourage banks to merge
so they become larger. We also find that capi-
tal adequacy ratio positively influences per-
formance. This finding supports the central
bank’s effort to strenghten banks’ capital base
by increasing the minimum capital adequacy
ratio from 8 percent to 12 percent. Finally,
we find that the regional banks consistently
outperform private banks in both perfor-
mance measures. One possible explanation
is that the regional banks have the privilege
of obtaining funding from local governments
so they can offer low interest rate for the
funding. From the perspective of  competi-
tion policy, this privilege can be viewed as
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unfair to other banks. Further, from the tax
payers’ point of  view, it may also not be in
their best interests to spend their taxes on low-
interest investments such as savings/deposits
in regional banks. Thus, the policy of  pro-
viding privileges to regional banks for access-
ing cheap funding may need to be reassessed
in light of  these concerns.
Conclusions
This study aims to investigate the cau-
sality relationship (endogeneity) between CG
practices and bank performance. The deter-
minants of  bank performance are CG prac-
tice, age of bank, CAR, and type of banks
while the determinants of  CG practices are
bank performance, size of  bank, foreign own-
ership, and listing status.
Using a composite index of CG accord-
ing to Bank Indonesia regulation No. 8/14/
PBI, we find that CG practices, CAR, re-
gional bank and foreign-owned bank have
positive influences on bank performance
measured by ROA. But, bank performance
measured by ROE is only positively affected
by CG practices and regional bank.
Further, we find that CG practices have
a positive impact on bank performance, but
not vice versa. On the other words, we do
not find the causality relationship between
CG practices and bank performance. This
study also shows that CG practices are posi-
tively affected by size of bank.
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